all the
phenomena of organic and animal life? It is certain that he regarded
these active qualities, as the causes of all the phenomena, whether of
living or dead matter.--GLISSON ought not certainly then to be regarded
as the author of this dogma in medical philosophy. PLATO certainly
taught it. VAN HELMONT could not get along without investing matter with
what he called a "seminal likeness, which is the more inward spiritual
kernel of the seed," &c. But we will let him speak for himself.
"Whatsoever," says V. H., "cometh into the world, must needs have the
beginning of its motions, the stirrer up and inward director of
generation. Therefore all things, however hard and thick they are, yet
before that their soundness, they inclose in themselves an air, which
representeth the inward future generation to the seed in this respect
fruitful, and accompanies the thing generated, even to the end of the
stage: which air, although it be in some things more plentiful, yet, in
vegetables it is pressed together in the show of a juice, as also in
metals it is thickened with a most thick homogeniety or sameliness of
kind. Notwithstanding this gift hath happened to all things, which is
called _archeus_, or chief workman, containing the fruitfulness of
generations or seeds, as it were the internal efficient cause; I say
that workman hath the likeness of the thing generated, unto the
beginning whereof, he composeth the appointments of things to be done.
But the chief workman consists of the _conjoining of the vital air_, as
of the matter, with the seminal likeness, which is the more outward
spiritual kernel, containing the fruitfulness of the seed; but the
visible seed is only the husk of this. This image of the master workman,
issuing out of the first shape or idea of its predecessor, or snatching
the same to itself out of the cup or bosom of outward things, is not a
certain dead image, but made famous by a full knowledge, and adorned
with necessary powers of things to be done in its appointment; and so it
is the first or chief instrument of life and feeling. But since every
corporeal act is limited into a body, hence it comes to pass, that the
archeus, the workman and governor of generations, doth clothe himself
presently with a bodily clothing. For in things soulified, he walketh
thorow all the dens and retiring places of his seed, and begins to
transform the matter according to the perfect act of his own image; for
here he placeth the heart, but there appointeth the brain, and he every
where limiteth an unmoveable chief dweller, out of his whole monarchy,
according to the bounds of requirance of the parts and appointments. At
length that president remaineth the overseer and inward ruler of the
bounds, even until death; but the other, floating about and being
assigned to no member, keeps the oversight over the particular pilots of
the members, being clear and never at rest or keeping holiday."
Notwithstanding the affected and euphuistic jargon of the above
passages, it is evident that VAN HELMONT'S idea is very similar to that
of GALEN. By seminal likeness, we are to understand an aptitude in
matter to take on certain determinate forms, and this may be supposed to
differ not very essentially from those laws, which govern matter in
crystallization. But even this seminal likeness, as we perceive, is a
sort of abstraction, very analogous to the Galenical caliditas; for it
is the more inward spiritual kernel of the seed, whereby the matter is
enabled to enjoy a certain degree of activity, the degree of which is
much increased by the union of the air, or archeus, with it. So the
caliditas of GALEN, which, after all, is matter, gives to its subject
the powers which it enjoys. GLISSON, speaking of the natura seminalis,
says that it is a certain or specific essence, superadded to mere
elementary principles, by means of which mixt bodies adopt certain
determinate forms, and acquire the faculty of performing essential
operations, more noble than those which belong to naked elements.
We regret very much that we have been unable to procure a copy of
GLISSON'S treatise de vita naturæ, which, so far as we know, can not be
had in this country. We shall, therefore, furnish our readers with the
following passage from the Biographie Medicale, from the pen of
JOURDAIN.
"The name of GLISSON occupies an honourable place in the history of
medicine, because to him we are indebted for the first elements of the
physiological doctrine of the present day. Instead of directing his
attention to movements alone, as the iatro-mathematicians, and even, to
a certain extent, the animists had done, he referred to vitality all the
phenomena of nature, of whatever kind, and attempted to reduce them to
one, common principle. To this end he admitted, that matter is
originally endued with forces inherent in it, and that living bodies in
particular, are invested in their organs with a radical force, which,
put in play by stimulants, whether internal or external, gives rise to
all the phenomena of life. He even went so far as to assert, that
sympathy may be explained by referring to the intercommunication of this
force, to which he gave the name of irritability."
We shall also cite from SPRENGEL, a passage which throws some light on
his theory.
"When they became unwilling, like DESCARTES and STAHL, to have constant
recourse in their explanations, to the soul, they tried to find a
philosophic proof of the existence of material forces, to show that
matter, as mere matter, is endowed with particular forces, with which
they might satisfactorily explain a great many of its phenomena. No one
had hitherto sought for a similar proof; for ARISTOTLE had contented
himself with an axiom, that all natural things contain in themselves the
sufficient cause of their movement and rest. GLISSON and LEIBNITZ set
themselves in search of this proof; but it was reserved for the immortal
KANT to find it in the nature of matter itself.
"FRANCIS GLISSON may with propriety be considered as the precursor of
LEIBNITZ. What he tried to demonstrate by scholastic subtlety, and by
thousands of syllogisms, was developed by LEIBNITZ with a clearness and
ability, which secured the suffrages, even of the unenlightened. Both of
them went too far, in attributing life and sensation to matter, instead
of claiming for it the two simple and primordial forces of attraction
and repulsion.
"GLISSON sets out with the idea of substance, but he does not explain it
with sufficient precision. Every substance has three substantial
rudiments,--_fundamental_ substance, by means of which it
exists,--_energetic_ substance, by means of which it acts,--and
_additional_ substance, which determines its accidental qualities. All
matter, as substance, must have an energetic substance or nature, which
is the internal principle of movement. Therefore whatever moves
spontaneously, and in virtue of an internal force, must _feel_ this
motion, _and desire it_. All matter feels that it is, and that it exists
by itself. It has therefore, consciousness of its own nature. Life
consists in the activity of the internal substantial energetic nature.
Death is the dissolution of the triple alliance of the internal
energetic substantial nature, with the vegetative and animal natures,
which two last belong to the _additional_ substance."[28]
In applying his theory to physiology, GLISSON'S idea is, that the fibres
of the human body are endowed with a force, which he divides into three
kinds; to wit, natural or inherent force, (robur insitum)--vital force,
(robur vitale)--and animal force, (robur animale.)
Natural or inherent force, is a part of the constitution of the fibre,
and is as much a property of its organization as are its tenacity,
tensibility, &c. The sum of this force varies, in proportion as the
constitution of the fibre is more or less perfect. It is strongest in
athletic men and strong animals, and weaker in relaxed and debilitated
persons. It may be compared with the contractilité de tissu of BICHAT.
The second, or vital force, is something superadded to the inherent
sort. It is an _influxus_, derived to any fibre or set of fibres, from
that greater sum of force, which arises out of a more elaborate,
complex, and exalted organization. It varies in proportion as the vital
spirits flow with more or less freedom; and in proportion as their
quality is more or less perfect.
The third kind, or robur animale, may be supposed to depend on the
organic constitution of the brain and nerves, and varies according to
the state of that organization. We cannot help adverting to the
resemblance between these two latter kinds, and the contractilité
organique, and contractilité animale, of BICHAT; and this robur
comprises, as we shall show hereafter, both the contractilité and
sensibilité of the French physiologist.
GLISSON, in his chapter de Irritabilitate fibrarum, commences by
remarking that a motive faculty existing in any fibre, unless it were of
an irritable nature, would leave such fibre in one of the two following
states: 1. It would either never cease from action, or 2ndly, being once
at rest, its motion could never be reproduced; but the varieties and
differences which we see in the actions of fibres, clearly demonstrate
them to be possessed of irritability: i.e. if a fibre may be by turns in
a state of action and repose, it is evidently possessed of a quality,
whereby it can be induced to move if in a state of rest; this quality he
terms irritable, or irritability. The next inference from this power of
alternate activity and repose is, that the fibre is possessed of a
faculty, whereby it can _perceive_ an irritation offered to it; but this
perception of irritation further implies an _appetence_ for a change of
its actual state, before the motion can really take place. Perception,
appetence, and motion, make a triunit. "In the mean time, says he, as
sensitive appetence, and sensibility, are frequently confounded with
natural perception, in this irritation of the fibres," he divides it
into three kinds, viz. Natural Perception, Sensitive Perception, and
Perception regulated by animal appetency.
Natural Perception is that principle whereby a fibre perceiving any
alteration offered to it, whether pleasing or displeasing, is excited
either to accept that change, or to avoid it, and moves accordingly.
Sensitive Perception, is that kind, in which a fibre, perceiving a
change effected in some other organ, is impelled ad aliquid appetendum,
and to move conformably.
The third sort, or Perception regulated by animal appetency, is that in
which the brain directs from within, such movements of the muscular
fibres, as are requisite for the execution of any purpose.
"Some persons," says GLISSON, "may doubt whether there really exists a
natural perception of irritation in the fibres; but we have elsewhere
asserted in general the reality of natural perception, to wit, in my
work, de Vita Naturæ; and whoever has known it, will readily admit this
quality in fibres imbued with inherent, influent, and vital spirits. We
do not expect, in this place, to establish it as a general principle;
but if any proof, derived from a knowledge of the structure, uses, and
actions of the fibres, can be adduced, it may be here attempted."
"It is indubitable that the fibres are alternately at rest and in
motion; for, during sleep, they are all relaxed, with the exception of
such as subserve the functions of respiration and circulation, and even
these are by turns quiet and active. During waking again, they are all
in a state of moderate tonic motion; and moreover, during all movements
of the limbs, the antagonist muscles yield spontaneously, the abductors
being active, while the adductors are relaxed, and vice versa. Hence it
is manifest, that the fibres are alternately quiescent and active: but,
since they are not _principal_ or sui arbitrii agents, it is necessary,
in order to the new movement, that they should be irritated from some
source: for, it is impossible that a fibre in repose, can be set in
action without an irritating cause; nor can we conceive of a part being
irritated without _perceiving_ the irritation. It is like speaking to a
deaf man, or trying to awaken a dead one."
"If you say, fibres are possessed of sensibility, and can be excited by
virtue thereof, I confess that they are sensible parts, and may thereby
perceive some, not all irritating causes; but whether sensation excites
them immediately, or rather, is transmitted to the brain, and irritates
the animal appetency; and further, whether the animal appetence, effects
a movement in them directly, and to what sort of perception this
irritation may be properly and immediately ascribed, is detailed in
order below, when we